DMA Optimal Layout for Protection of Water Distribution Networks from Malicious Attack 机翻标题: 暂无翻译,请尝试点击翻译按钮。

会议集名/来源
Critical information infrastructures security: 12th international conference on critical information infrastructures security (CRITIS 2017), October 8-13 2017, Lucca, Italy
出版年
2018
页码
84-96
会议地点
Lucca
作者单位
Dipartimento di Ingegneria, Universita degli Studi della Campania 'Luigi Vanvitelli', via Roma 9, 81031 Aversa, ItalyDipartimento di Ingegneria, Universita degli Studi della Campania 'Luigi Vanvitelli', via Roma 9, 81031 Aversa, Italy,Istituto Sistemi Complessi (Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche), via dei Taurini 19, 00185 Rome, ItalyDipartimento di Ingegneria, Universita degli Studi della Campania 'Luigi Vanvitelli', via Roma 9, 81031 Aversa, ItalyDipartimento di Ingegneria, Universita degli Studi della Campania 'Luigi Vanvitelli', via Roma 9, 81031 Aversa, ItalyDipartimento di Ingegneria, Universita degli Studi della Campania 'Luigi Vanvitelli', via Roma 9, 81031 Aversa, ItalyDipartimento di Ingegneria, Universita degli Studi della Campania 'Luigi Vanvitelli', via Roma 9, 81031 Aversa, Italy
作者
Simeone Chianese;Armando Di Nardo;Michele Di Natale;Carlo Giudicianni;Dino Musmarra;Giovanni Francesco Santonastaso
摘要
Water distribution networks (WDNs) are among the most important civil networks, because they deliver drinking and industrial water to metropolitan areas, supporting economic prosperity and quality of life. Therefore, they constitute critical infrastructures (CIs) as systems whose operability are of crucial importance to ensure social survival and welfare. In the last years, extreme natural events and intentional malicious attacks have shown that global safeguard of systems cannot be ever performed. In this regard, critical infrastructure protection (CIP) strategies should be focused both on the prevention of these events and on the procedures for the functioning recovery and damage limitation. In this paper, starting from previous works of the authors, the impact of an intentional contamination attack to water distribution network and a possible strategy to mitigate the user risk have been studied, simulating the introduction of potassium cyanide with a backflow attack into water system. As protection technique, the water network partitioning (WNP) has been adopted in order to improve the management and also to reduce the extent of damage showing a dual use-value. WNP reveals to be an efficient way to protect water networks from malicious contamination, through the closure of gate valves by a remote control system creating semi-independent District Meter Areas (DMAs). The study also investigates the possibility to identify a priori the most critical point of a water distribution network for the malicious attack through a novel procedure based on topological metric. The methodology, tested on a real medium size water network in Italy, shows very interesting results in terms of mitigation risk.
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关键词
Critical infrastructure;Water protection;Water network partitioning
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