Safeguards and security risks at the (very) front end of the nuclear fuel cycle 机翻标题: 暂无翻译,请尝试点击翻译按钮。

来源
The Nonproliferation review
年/卷/期
2018 / 25 / 5/6
页码
457-476
ISSN号
1073-6700
作者
Justin V. Hastings;Cindy Vestergaard;
摘要
Historically, there have been limited international controls at the very front end of the nuclear fuel cycle, which consists of mining, processing, transportation, and conversion of natural uranium. However, an evolving framework of nuclear-security treaties along with International Atomic Energy Agency clarifications of the materials subject to its safeguards obligations are increasing the coverage of source materials, raising the question of how new and traditional uranium suppliers should handle safeguards and security in the production of uranium. We use a risk framework to assess the likelihood and consequences of different proliferation risks. Although the consequences for proliferation are generally low, risks to the very front end are different for safeguards (state diversion) and nuclear-materials security (unauthorized removal by non-state actors). For safeguards risks, cases of diversion or undeclared activities are concentrated at conversion facilities, while theft or trafficking of front-end material represents a relatively small percentage of total security incidents, concentrated in countries with lower levels of nuclear-materials security. We conclude that safeguards and security obligations should be commensurate with the risks. An appropriate response should involve a risk-based, graduated approach to nuclear security and a flexible, more clearly framed approach to safeguards.
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关键词/主题词
uranium mining;uranium milling;nuclear security;safeguards;nuclear proliferation;nuclear security;International Atomic Energy Agency;uranium conversion;
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